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EXITING THE EURO
By
Frederick V. Perry, Ph.D., J.D.*
and
Wendy Gelman, J.D., LL.M.**
ABSTRACT
The Crisis in the Euro Zone threatens to break up the Euro and
perhaps derail the European Union itself. Many argue that a Member
State exiting the Euro would be not only unthinkable, but also a prac-
tical impossibility, given the status of the “constitutionality” of Euro-
pean law, the treaties forming the European Union and the Euro, and
customary European law. Europeans have been, for centuries, very
creative in forging economic and trading alliances—some that ap-
peared to be political alliances and even elementary union.  They have
also, on more than one occasion, attempted to confect monetary stabil-
ity.  Some of these attempts were successful for long periods, while the
monetary bits have often not been so successful. This article explores
the proposition that a unilateral exit, an expulsion of a member, a
breakup of the European Monetary Union (EMU), or even a breakup of
the European Union itself is possible under international law. Indeed,
some or a combination of the foregoing may transpire. Some consider
such an action impossible inasmuch as Member States have relin-
quished their sovereignty. It can, however, be argued that a Member
State can either withdraw or be ejected from the EMU under existing
law.
INTRODUCTION
On October 12, 2012, the European Union won the Nobel Peace
Prize.1  At the time, the EMU was struggling to bail out a number of
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University; B.A., M.A., Kent State University; J.D., University of Akron School of
Law; Ph.D., University of Miami.
** Senior Instructor, School of Accounting, Florida International University; Lan-
don Teaching and Student Engagement Fellow, College of Business, Florida Inter-
national University; B.B.A., Florida International University, 1989; J.D. & LL.M.
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1 Alan Cowell & Nicholas Kulish, Nobel Committee Gives Prize to European
Union, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/13/
world/nobel-peace-prize.html.
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Member States—Greece in particular—and some said the award sym-
bolized “as much hope as achievement.”2  With the award, the Nobel
committee seemed to be urging the EU not to allow its recent struggles
to abort its grand mission of a unified Europe and “sounded at times
like a plea to support the endangered institution at a difficult hour.”3
The committee thereby forcefully demonstrated the continuing strong
appeal of European unity to the psyche of many Europeans.
Though it began as an economic exercise, the EU was clearly
intended to serve as a mechanism to prevent another European war
and would be “indispensable to peace.”4  Additionally, the Euro was
intended to be the ultimate achievement of European solidarity and
was designed to fortify the common market by “reducing transaction
costs and removing the risks of competitive devaluation.”5 Now, some
question whether the Euro will survive and, more importantly,
whether it could destroy the EU.6
A breakup of the EU—or any feature of it—is supposed to be
difficult.  In many respects, its founders meant the EU to be perma-
nent.  Thus, when discussing a possible exit of a Member State, the
rethinking by a Member State of its conditions of membership, a
breakup of the EU, or the disintegration of the single European cur-
rency, one must be careful to analyze the legal foundations of the EU,
custom and practice in the EU and international law, and the text of
various treaties.
In 2009, Member States ratified the Treaty of Lisbon.7  Among
its provisions, the treaty included an article on “voluntary withdrawal
of a Member State from the Union.”8  Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon
allows a Member State to withdraw without any preconditions and
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Harold Callender, France Proposes a Coal-Steel Pool With Germans in it, N.Y.
TIMES, May 10, 1950, available at http://www.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/topics/eu/
1950-05-10-NewsArticle.pdf.
5 Charlemagne: Coming off the Rails, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 20, 2012, available at
http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21564851-euro-was-meant-underpin-sin-
gle-market-it-may-end-up-undermining-it.
6 Id.
7 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Es-
tablishing the European Community, Dec. 17, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinaf-
ter Treaty of Lisbon] (amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
Establishing the European Communities).  The Treaty of Lisbon renamed the
amended treaties the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (com-
monly referred to as the TFEU).  In doing so, the Treaty of Lisbon diplomatically
avoided referring to the document as a “constitution.” Id.
8 Press Release, European Union, Explaining the Treaty of Lisbon (Dec. 1, 2009),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-09-531_en.htm.
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provides that any such withdrawal will become effective upon the oc-
currence of either (1) negotiation of withdrawal arrangements with the
other Member States, or (2) two years following the initial election of
withdrawal.9  Regardless of the reasons for inclusion of such a provi-
sion, it is now clear that there is a path by which a Member State can
leave the EU in its entirety.  Less clear, however, is whether a Member
State can choose to stop using the Euro and return to using a national
currency, without abandoning the European Union as a whole.
Some features of the European Union remain popular, such as
elimination of trade barriers and freedom of movement. European citi-
zens now take these essential features for granted.10  However, it has
become clear that the main challenge to preservation of the EU is
managing the ongoing financial crisis within the structure of a single
currency.  If the EU cannot continue to exist in its current formulation
and membership without a single currency, then this is more than a
Greek, Italian, or Spanish problem alone.  Instead, it is an existential
challenge to the EU.  It is therefore critical to carefully analyze how
one or a number of Member States can exit the EMU, within the cur-
rent legal framework of the EU and without destroying the EU in its
entirety.  This article will explore the proposition and make the argu-
ment that such an exit or modification of treaty obligations, while chal-
lenging, is legally possible.11
EUROPEAN CREATIVITY
In order to understand the current state of the Euro, we must
first explore the origins and evolution of the EMU and the EU. Since
the Middle Ages, Europeans have been at the forefront in the area of
legal and economic integration. Economists from the days of Adam
Smith12 to the modern day have argued for the benefits of free trade.
The Charter of the United Nations calls for all nations to “employ in-
ternational machinery for the promotion of the economic and social ad-
vancement of all peoples.”13 The famous twentieth Century economist,
Paul Samuelson, in extolling the virtues of free trade stated:
There is essentially only one argument for free trade or
freer trade, but it is an exceedingly powerful one,
9 Id.
10 Jack Ewing, Despite Prize, European Union Loses Much of Its Appeal as Unity
Eludes Continent, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/13/
world/europe/despite-prize-unity-is-elusive-in-the-european-union.html.
11 See Frederick V. Perry et al., Is There A Way out of the Euro?, 25 INT’L J. FIN. 1
(forthcoming 2013).
12 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND THE CAUSE OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS bk. IV, at 414 (Modern Library ed. 1937) (1776).
13 U.N. Charter pmbl.
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namely: Free trade promotes a mutually profitable divi-
sion of labor, greatly enhances the potential real national
product for all nations, and makes possible higher stan-
dards of living all over the globe.14
Europeans have waived the banner of free trade for centuries and have
been among the world’s innovators in cooperation in the legal, com-
mercial, and economic spheres.  The Lex Rhodia, or the Rhodian law,
for example, provided a codification of merchant practices governing
trade in the Mediterranean area.15  In the thirteenth century, codified
laws, thought to have originated in Barcelona, were carried by
merchants throughout Europe.16  Because “(t)hroughout the centuries,
consensuality appears as the bastion of international commerce,”17
these laws were adopted as custom and used throughout the trading
area.  Thus, from approximately 1340 AD, the Consolato del Mare be-
came recognized as an “international body of mercantile custom.”18
As a result of  a growth in sea borne commerce, regulations
arose in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries which formed a true in-
ternational law governing commerce in the European area. This was
not a codified law of any particular sovereign, but rather a customary
law,19 which later, when codified in various sovereign areas, was all
similarly based on the universal law merchant, since:
The socioeconomic features which typified this ancient
law Merchant also constituted the reasons for its subsis-
tence.  There was the underlying need to promote trade
based on freedom, subject to the need to pay a “just price”
and subject to the need to avoid usurious interest rates.
Law which mandated trade beyond this arena would
generate economic loss, cause social disapproval and in-
fringe upon public welfare.  Rulers who sought by means
of national law to rigidify this free commerce would in-
hibit the success of exchanges in the marketplace—to the
loss of both the foreign and the local merchant
community.20
A demand for expanding trade and a mutual need for free trade and
uniform laws or customs made Medieval Europe an ideal place for
14 PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 692 (10th ed. 1976).
15 Leon E. Trakman, The Evolution of the Law Merchant: Our Commercial Heri-
tage, 12 J. MAR. L. & COM. 153, 156 (1981).
16 Id.
17 Id. at 153.
18 Id. at 156.
19 Id. at 157.
20 Id.
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such a generalized set of law and custom accepted by, if not all, at least
most.21
A sort of precursor to the European Union was formed in the
12th century by a group of European cities wishing to trade among
themselves and provide not only common rules for trade, but also se-
curity for such trade. This group became known as the Hanseatic
League.22  The league lasted for 300 years and came about because
feudal overlords were generally weak and because people who lived in
cities had different interests from those of such overlords.  City dwell-
ers wanted trade.23  “The main activities of the groups of nobles in-
volved marrying and feuding with one another and raising taxes from
their subjects. They were rarely noted for their interest in trade, ex-
cept as a source of taxation.”24 Trading cities in Germany, Belgium,
the Baltic States,25 Poland, the Netherlands, and Russia traded
among themselves as members of this alliance.  The rise of the nation-
state around the time of the Peace of Westphalia led to the demise of
the League.  Prominent merchants from the cities banded together to
form a loose alliance in order to protect themselves and share risks
associated with trade, travel, and troublesome feudal lords.26
The Hanseatic League had a form of parliament that discussed
common interests, such as common approaches to piracy, trading mat-
ters, and troublesome sovereigns.  The league raised soldiers and
fleets to protect themselves when necessary.27  They even defeated
King Valdemar of Denmark, who had attacked the Hansa city of Visby
over trading disputes.  Over 70 cities of the league contributed to that
defeat.28  The league, however, was never a coherent political organi-
zation, since its members’ conflicting interests prevented any real po-
litical cohesion.29  Even so, the league was successful in imposing its
political and commercial will over the region and in defending itself
and its interests for centuries.
21 Id. at 158.
22 See Stephen Halliday, The First Common Market?, 59 HIST. TODAY 31 (July
2009), available at http://www.historytoday.com/stephen-halliday/first-common-
market-hanseatic-league.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 32.
25 The term “state” or “states” will be used throughout this Article. It is used in its
international legal context to mean a sovereign nation state.  To the extent that
the term refers to a sovereign state, a member of the United States of America,
such as the state of Ohio, it will be precisely so stated.
26 Halliday, supra note 22.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
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Stephen Halliday has suggested a comparison between the ef-
forts of the League and the modern European Union because “(t)he EU
started as a means of promoting peaceful trading relationships among
its members, in particular the old enemies of France and Germany,
and has attempted to develop a degree of ever greater political union
among them. Like the Hansa, the EU has often promoted the trading
interests of its own members at the expense of others.”30
We know also that modern Public International Law is said to
have been first created in Europe, and that it rose to prominence with
the rise of the European nation-state.31 The period between the Peace
Treaty of Westphalia of 164832 and the Congress of Vienna of 1815,33
very much a European phenomena, is generally considered the forma-
tion period of classical international law.34 The Dutch writer Hugo
Grotius (1583-1645) is widely considered the father of modern interna-
tional law,35 though it appears that the Spanish friar, Francisco de
Vitoria (1492-1546), was the first to write on the subject.36 Both writ-
ers were European, and their writings have had a great deal of influ-
ence on subsequent developments. In fact, international law was
generally Eurocentric until after World War II.
In 1951, with the goal of preventing future wars, France, West
Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg formed
the European Coal and Steel Community by pooling the region’s coal
and steel industries.37 Six years later, those same six states created
the European Economic Community, thereby removing tariff barriers
among themselves.38 In 1967, they become the European Community
and, in 1991, after being joined by Britain, Greece, Spain, and Portu-
gal, the Member States signed a treaty in Maastricht, the Nether-
lands, which laid the groundwork for a common currency.39 The
Maastricht Treaty was a major addition to the Treaty of Rome and
created a common citizenship, a common defense and security policy,
30 Id.
31 CE´sar SepU´lveda, Derecho Internacional PU´blico 7 (5th ed. 1973).
32 The Treaty of Westphalia ended the so-called Thirty Years War—a general Eu-
ropean war arising partly as a result of the Protestant Reformation. See The
Treaty of Westphalia, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/west-
phal.xasp.
33 The Congress of Vienna ended the Napoleonic Wars in Europe.
34 ALINA KACZOROWSKA, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 3  (4th ed. 2010).
35 Id.
36 SEPU´lveda, supra note 31, at 13.
37 The March Toward Unity, SCHOLASTIC UPDATE, Mar. 22, 1999, at 4.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 4-5.
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and economic and monetary union.40 To symbolize this renewed com-
mitment, the name was changed from European Community to Euro-
pean Union.41
Since the Treaty of Rome, the Member States have tried vari-
ous methods to attain monetary stability, but not all have been suc-
cessful.42 The march toward a common currency was fraught with
difficulties.43 At first the Member States wished merely to be able to
have stable exchange rates.44 In the 1970’s, the German Mark was
buffeted by an unstable dollar.45 This led to unstable exchange rates
throughout the European Community, which gave rise to serious plan-
ning and coordination problems among the Member States, distorting
intra-Community trade.46  Then, in 1972, there was an effort to coordi-
nate Community currencies by means of a “Snake” mechanism,
whereby the currencies, linked together, were supposed to move to-
gether against outside currencies.47 The British left the Snake a few
weeks after it started; the French left twice and rejoined.48 The Snake
appeared to be neither popular, nor widely successful.49
In 1978, the Council of Ministers adopted a Resolution to cre-
ate a European Monetary System (“EMS”).  Thus, the EMS created the
Exchange Rate Mechanism.50  The Exchange Rate Mechanism served
as a mini-Bretton Woods arrangement among the currencies of the
Member States.51 The Member States’ currencies could float in tan-
dem against the Dollar and the Yen, providing a counterweight
against them, and, thereby, it was thought, provide for stable ex-
change rates and economic growth.52
40 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community art. 1, Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome], available at http://ec.europa.eu/
economy_finance/emu_history/documents/treaties/rometreaty2.pdf (“By this
Treaty, the high contracting parties establish among themselves a European Eco-
nomic Community.”); Maastricht Treaty, arts. 2, 8, 199, Feb. 7, 1992, 2002 O.J. (C
325) 5, available at http://www.eurotreaties.com/maastrichtec.pdf.
41 Id.
42 See Terence Fokas, Economic and Monetary Union in Europe: The Legal Frame-
work and Implications for Contractual Obligations, 36 Tex. J. Bus. L. 2, 5-9 (1999).
43 Id. at 5-13.
44 Id. at 5-9.
45 LOWENFIELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC Law 782 (2d ed. 2008).
46 Id. at 772.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id..
50 LOWENFIELD, supra note 45, at 773.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 774.
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Each of the Member States that participated in the Exchange
Rate Mechanism was required to both establish a rate for its currency,
denominated in terms of a European Currency Unit (ECU), and to
maintain that rate with a prescribed margin.53 If the currency ap-
proached either extreme of that margin, the issuing country of the cur-
rency, or its central bank, was required to intervene.54 If it needed
money to do that, it could borrow on a short-term basis from a central
fund to which all Members had contributed.55 The ECU was a precur-
sor to the Euro, which was created twenty years later.56 The ECU
functioned as both a unit of account, based on a basket of currencies
that had different values weighted in accordance with their relative
economic importance, as well as an asset that could be used for inter-
vention and settlement among the central banks of the Community.57
This system depended not only upon the Member States following the
foregoing mechanism, but also upon their economic performance.58 If
both operated smoothly, the system would work.59 However, if the eco-
nomic performance of the Member States was not sufficiently uniform,
the system simply could not boost the weaker currencies.60
Though the EMS had many ups and downs in its brief history,
it appeared to be working by the end of the 1980s.61 That success led to
the creation of the Maastricht Treaty, calling for the formation of an
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) with a common currency and a
single European Central Bank.62 After execution of the Maastricht
Treaty in February 1992, and prior to its ratification and implementa-
tion, the EMU essentially collapsed.63 The German Mark was ad-
versely impacted, the Pound and the Lira were unable to maintain
stability, and the French Franc was in turmoil.64  The Maastricht
Treaty was barely ratified.65 Supporters achieved ratification with the
backing of Denmark, which only ratified the treaty on the condition
that it would not have to become a user of the Euro.66
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 LOWENFIELD, supra note 45, at 774.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 775.
59 Id.
60 LOWENFIELD, supra note 45, at 775.
61 Id. at 776.
62 Id. at 777.
63 Id. at 782.
64 Id. at 778-79.
65 LOWENFIELD, supra note 45, at 785.
66 Id.
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The objective of the Euro was to do away with divergence of
currency values and interest rates.67 Members would no longer be able
to devalue their currencies.68 Moreover, although fiscal policies (deci-
sions regarding expenditures and revenues) were to be controlled by
each Member State, these decisions were to be subject to strict conver-
gence criteria and under the supervision and control of authorities in
Brussels.69  Just as importantly, a single currency had a symbolic po-
litical value: unification.
The Maastricht Treaty requires that the Member States en-
sure that their governments do not manage their central banks or re-
quire the banks to report to them:
ARTICLE 106
1. The ESCB shall be composed of the ECB and of the
national central banks.
2. The ECB shall have legal personality.
3. The ESCB shall be governed by the decision-making
bodies of the ECB which
shall be the Governing Council and the Executive
Board. . .
ARTICLE 108
Each Member State shall ensure, at the latest at the
date of the establishment of the ESCB, that its national
legislation including the statutes of its national central
bank is
compatible with this Treaty and the Statute of the
ESCB.70
Another requirement of the Maastricht Treaty is that Member States
“regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern and
shall co-ordinate them within the (European) Council . . .”71  Surveil-
lance by the European Commission must focus on two main issues:  (1)
the ratio of government deficit to gross domestic product, and (2) the
ratio of government debt to gross domestic product.72  During the tran-
sition stage, the performance of all Member States was closely moni-
tored.73 Once the Euro took effect, it was highly questionable as to
whether Belgium and Italy would be able to comply with the new
67 Id. at 782.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Maastricht Treaty, arts. 106, 108, Feb. 7, 1992, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 5, available at
http://www.eurotreaties.com/maastrichtec.pdf.
71 Id. at art. 103.
72 LOWENFIELD, supra note 45, at 783-84.
73 Id. at 784.
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guidelines.74 In the end, they were both permitted to enter the EMU,
since it appeared that their trends were heading in the right direc-
tion.75  Economists agreed that, at the moment of its formation, the
Euro zone was not an optimum currency area, but many believed that
over time it could become closer to being one.76
However, not all Member States followed the directives.  As a
result, economies diverged and the measures put in place by the Maas-
tricht Treaty were not followed, and/or, arguably, did not work.  For
example, even after its first bailout, the Greek politicians failed to live
up to their obligations for reform.77  Thus, from the beginning of this
crisis, the northern Europeans have resented funding what they see as
the profligacy and low work ethic of their southern brethren.
German leaders believe there is a need to fix the problem.78 It
is not as if the Euro crisis is a matter that can be easily rectified, how-
ever, or even that it is simply a western European problem.  The issues
at hand are, and have been, so serious that The Economist proclaimed
in 2011:
So grave, so menacing, so unstoppable has the euro crisis
become that even rescue talk only fuels ever-rising panic.
Investors have sniffed out that Europe’s leaders seem
unwilling ever to do enough. Yet unless politicians act
fast to persuade the world that their desire to preserve
the euro is greater than the markets’ ability to bet
against it, the single currency faces ruin. As credit lines
gum up and outsiders plead for action, it is not just the
euro that is at risk, but the future of the European Union
and the health of the world economy.79
Further still, some Europeans are losing faith in the “European Exper-
iment.”80 They wonder if it is worth it to lose their sovereignty in both
everyday and fiscal matters.81
74 Id. at 787.
75 Id.
76 Antonin  Rusek, The Nature of Shocks in Eurozone, 36 ATL. ECON. J. 371 (2008).
77 The Euro Crisis: What to Do About Greece, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 28, 2012, http:/
/www.economist.com/node/21543536.
78 See Europe’s Currency Crisis: How to Save the Euro, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 17,
2011, http://www.economist.com/node/21529049.
79 Id.
80 See Charlemagne: A Flawed Temple, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 16, 2013, http://
www.economist.com/news/europe/21573553-loss-legitimacy-may-now-be-biggest-
threat-european-project-flawed-temple.
81 See id.
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THE LAW OF TREATIES
Social and political groups, whether they are primitive tribes or
modern states, commonly have rules by which they regulate their con-
duct.82  At the modern state level, we typically call them laws.  Of
course in earlier, more primitive times, social groups governed them-
selves by custom, which was not written down anywhere, but was
merely remembered and followed.83 Such customs took on an “aura of
historical legitimacy.”84  States have recognized this notion of histori-
cal legitimacy in the international arena for centuries,85 and it has
come to define customary international law today. The role it plays in
international legal obligations,86 as international custom, is evidence
of a general practice accepted as law.87
Within those domestic systems of laws, modern states have
rules governing relations, economic and otherwise, between individu-
als and entities.  The documentation and the measure of those rela-
tions are generally referred to as “contracts.”  A contract is simply a set
of promises that the law will recognize as worthy of being enforced.88
Such law of contracts or, more generally, obligations as they are re-
ferred to in many civil law countries,89 has rules defining when a con-
tractual relationship arises, requirements for the formation of
contractual obligations, the precise obligations, when such obligations
arise, what constitutes a breach of the obligations, when the breach
arises, and what the remedies are for such breach.
This principle of making enforceable promises has also existed
at the state level, between states, for a very long time.90 We often call
such international arrangements “treaties.”91 Every state can enter
82 See generally Perry et al., supra note 11.
83 MALCOLM S. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 72 (6th ed. 2008).
84 Id.
85 SEPU´LVEDA, supra note 31, at 93.
86 For example, the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in defining the
sources of international law, places treaties and customary international law as
the as the primary source. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art.
38, Oct. 24, 1945, available at www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&
p3=0#CHAPTER_II.
87 Id.
88 See generally JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
1 (4th ed. 1998).
89 See MANUEL BEJARANO SA´NCHEZ, OBLIGACIONES CIVILES 26 (5th ed. 1999).
90 The first international treaty of which we have written evidence occurred be-
tween the city-states of Ummah and Lagash in Mesopotamia around the year 3100
B.C. See CARLOS ARRELLANO GARCI´A, PRIMER CURSO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL
PU´BLICO 3 (4th ed. 1999).
91 SHAW, supra note 83, at 72.
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into a treaty.92  The law of treaties deals with many of the same issues
as the domestic law of contract, but on an international level.93  In
international law, treaties are generally the source of written law,94 as
opposed to customary international law.  Treaties are an important el-
ement of international law; they work as a tool for both recognition
and creation of international legal obligations, and “have always been
an indispensable tool of diplomacy.”95  We see that “states transact a
vast amount of work using the device of the treaty; . . . wars [are] . . .
terminated, disputes settled, territory acquired, special interests de-
termined, alliances are established, international organizations are
created,”96 and private or individual rights and obligations are
generated.97
Accordingly, “[r]ecognizing the ever-increasing importance of
treaties as a source of international law and as a means of developing
peaceful co-operation among nations, whatever their constitutional
and social systems,”98 Member States of the United Nations created
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which codified prior
customary international law on treaties and created some new
norms.99  The Vienna Convention applies to treaties completed after
the Vienna Convention entered into effect as to its signatories.100  The
Treaties relating to the formation and continuation of the European
Union and the EMU are multilateral treaties, and in the case of multi-
lateral treaties, as to those Member States who ratified or acceded to
the Vienna Convention prior to signing any such EU treaties, the Vi-
enna Convention applies to their EU treaty signature and
compliance.101
Where the Vienna Convention does not control matters, cus-
tomary international law continues to apply.102  Accordingly, despite
the fact that the Vienna Convention itself does not apply retroactively,
customary international law does apply to any such treaties entered
into by contracting states.  However, inasmuch as the Vienna Conven-
tion codifies existing customary international law, it is generally con-
92 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 6, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
93 See VALERIE EPPS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 55 (4th ed. 2009).
94 CONWAY W. HENDERSON, UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL LAW 67 (2010).
95 ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 1 (2d ed. 2007).
96 SHAW, supra note 83, at 902-03.
97 See, e.g., United Nations Convention for the International Sale of Goods, April
11, 1980, 1498 U.N.T.S. 3.
98 Id. pmbl.
99 SHAW, supra note 83 at 903.
100 Vienna Convention, supra note 92, art. 4.
101 SHAW, supra note 83, at 903.
102 Vienna Convention, supra note 92, pmbl., art. 38.
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sidered by states to reflect the norms of treaty law for signatory states
and non-signatory states alike.103
In other words, the Vienna Convention is considered a reflec-
tion of customary international law by both non-signatory states, who
consider themselves bound by it,104 and by international and domestic
tribunals, who apply its terms even to treaties entered into decades
before its creation.105
The famous legal writer, J. L. Brierly, writing in the 1920’s,
long before the creation of the Vienna Convention, stated that:
“[c]ustom in its legal sense means something more than mere habit or
usage; it is a usage felt by those who follow it to be an obligatory
one.”106  Customary international law binds states, so long as it is gen-
erally accepted.  This is ascertained from the practice and behavior of
states.107  Nevertheless, what states generally do is half of the equa-
tion needed to determine the obligations provided by customary inter-
national law.  States must act in a certain way out of the belief that
such acts are legally required. They must act, in other words, under
what is termed opinion juris.108
Customary international law has governed the law of treaties
for thousands of years.  By the time of the outbreak of World War I,
there were around 8,000 international treaties in operation.109  The
League of Nations registered 4,822 treaties. Since 1945, the United
Nations has registered over 54,000 treaties.110 States have deposited
over 500 multilateral treaties with the United Nations.111  It is esti-
mated that this figure accounts for only about 70% of treaties entered
into force since the formation of the United Nations.112  Customary in-
ternational law governed treaties in the absence of any codification of
treaty rules113 as set forth in the Vienna Convention.
We will examine the matter of whether and to what extent a
state may suspend obligations under a treaty, exit from certain obliga-
tions created by a treaty relationship—whether that exit be unilateral
103 NANCY KONTOU, THE TERMINATION AND REVISION OF TREATIES IN THE LIGHT OF
NEW CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 (1994).
104 AUST, supra note 95, at 12.
105 Id. at 12-13.
106 J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF PEACE 59 (6th ed. 1963).
107 SHAW, supra note 83, at 73.
108 Id. at 75.
109 Aust, supra note 95, at 1.
110 Id.
111 Global Issues: International Law, UN.ORG, http://www.un.org/en/globalissues/
internationallaw/ (last visited July 2, 2013).
112 AUST, supra note 95, at 1.
113 See, e.g., BRIERLY, supra note 106, at 337.
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or multilateral, including the exiting state’s agreement or request to
exit, or agreed upon only by those opposing a contracting state’s con-
tinued treaty relationship—or simply terminate the treaty.  As set
forth above, states’ obligations respecting the treaties they have en-
tered into are governed by either the Vienna Convention, customary
international law, or both.
The United Nations espouses the proposition that all Member
States are equal sovereigns under the law, inasmuch as its charter
states: “The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign
equality of all its Members.”114  We can therefore start from the pro-
position that all states are considered sovereign, inasmuch as “[t]he
sovereignty  and equality of states represents the basic constitutional
doctrine of the law of nations, which governs a community consisting
primarily of states having uniform legal personality.”115  The corollary
of this notion is that “membership of international organizations is not
obligatory; and the powers of the organs of such organizations to deter-
mine their own competence, to take decisions by majority vote, and to
enforce decisions, depend on the consent of Member States.”116  Ac-
cordingly, the Member States of the European Union are sovereign
states.  As such, they are each free to enter into treaties, however de-
nominated.117  The corollary of such freedom is the freedom to amend
or exit from a treaty.
Of course, states cannot exit from treaty obligations whenever
they wish, since allowing such an activity would render treaties worth-
less.118 The rule of pacta sunt servanda is still valid international
law.119  However, conditions do arise where suspension or termination
of a treaty may be justified.120
All the members of the EMU, except France, have either rati-
fied or acceded to the Vienna Convention and are thus bound by its
terms.121  Five of them have filed reservations to the convention.122
All the members of the European Union, except France and Romania,
have either ratified or acceded to the Vienna Convention and are thus
114 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1.
115 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 280 (7th ed. 2008).
116 Id. at 281.
117 “ ‘[T]reaty’ means an international agreement concluded between States in
written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single
instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular des-
ignation.” Vienna Convention, supra note 92, art. 2, para. 1(a).
118 See KACZOROWSKA, supra note 34, at 127
119 Vienna Convention, supra note 92, art. 26.
120 KACZOROWSKA, supra note 34, at 127.
121 See Vienna Convention, supra note 92.
122 They are Belgium, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands and Portugal. Id.
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bound by its terms.123  None of those reservations have anything to do
with treaty formation, treaty abrogation, unilateral or multilateral
withdrawal from a treaty or its obligations, or expulsion from a multi-
lateral treaty.124
It follows, therefore, that those provisions of the Vienna Con-
vention that deal with the issues of treaty formation, treaty abroga-
tion, unilateral or multilateral withdrawal from a treaty or its
obligations, or expulsion from a multilateral treaty are binding on both
the Member States of the E.U. and the Member States of the E.M.U.
Of course, all members of the E.M.U. are members of the E.U., but the
converse is not true.125
The treaties that form the E.U. and the E.M.U. are not subject
to interpretation under international law in exactly the same way as
other treaties. Rather, they give rise to a new and different kind of
regime, whereby rather than having the domestic courts of the Mem-
ber States provide interpretations of the treaty obligations of such
states, the E.U. courts are responsible for the interpretation.126
Contracts and treaties require respect. Otherwise, relations
governed thereby would be unpredictable, and no one would use either
instrument.  Accordingly, similar to obligations under the general law
of contracts, with which most people in the modern world are familiar,
a state cannot relieve itself of the obligation to adhere to and perform
pursuant to the terms of a treaty to whose terms that state has agreed.
As mentioned above, any state entering into a treaty can ex-
pect to be bound by it because, under the long valued norm of interna-
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 The E.U is composed of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ire-
land, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portu-
gal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. See
Member Countries of the European Union, EUROPEAN UNION, http://europa.eu/
about-eu/countries/member-countries/ (last visited July 15, 2013).  The E.M.U. is
composed of Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia,
Slovenia, and Spain. See The Euro, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/
economy_finance/euro/ (last visited July 15, 2013).
126 Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 7, art. 19(1) (“The Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Union shall include the Court of Justice, the General Court and specialised
courts. It shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties
the law is observed.”); see also The Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance,
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/1_3_9_en.htm
(last visited July 15, 2013).
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tional law, pacta sunt servanda, the agreement must be respected.127
Initially, this principle was merely a matter of customary interna-
tional law,128 simply respected by states. By the 19th century, how-
ever, it was set forth in writing as an international legal obligation:
first in the 1871 Declaration of London129 and later in the Covenant of
the League of Nations, calling for “a scrupulous respect for all treaty
obligations,”130 and the Charter of the United Nations, providing: “All
Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits re-
sulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations as-
sumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.”131 Further,
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention, entitled Pacta Sunt Servana,
states: “Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must
be performed by them in good faith.”132 Article 5 of the Vienna Con-
vention provides that it “applies to any treaty which is the constituent
instrument of an international organization and to any treaty adopted
within an international organization . . .”133
Even so, there are times when suspension or termination of a
treaty is necessary and justified134 under the doctrine of rebus sic stan-
tibus.135  In the case of suspension, a treaty is still valid, but its opera-
tion has been suspended, while in the case of treaty termination, the
treaty no longer exists.136  The Vienna Convention recognizes this no-
tion and provides for both suspension137 and termination of trea-
ties.138  A treaty may be terminated or denounced, or a party may
withdraw from it only under the provisions of the treaty or under the
terms of the Vienna Convention.139
The situations under which a treaty may be suspended are set
forth in Articles 57 and 58 of the Vienna Convention.  Under Article
57(a), treaties can be suspended by resorting to the mechanisms set
forth in the treaty.  Most other treaties do not provide such language
or mechanisms. In that event, all the contracting parties may agree to
127 Pact Sunt Servana, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL MONITOR, September 2008,
judicialmonitor.org/archive_0908/generalprinciples.html.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 League of Nations Covenant pmbl.
131 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 2.
132 Vienna Convention, supra note 92, art. 26.
133 Id., art. 5.
134 KACZOROWSKA, supra note 34, at 127.
135 BRIERLY, supra note 106, at 335.
136 Id.
137 Vienna Convention, supra note 92, art. 72.
138 Id. art. 42(2).
139 Id.
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suspend the treaty.140  In the case of a multilateral treaty, parties can
resort to any suspension mechanism mentioned in the treaty.141  In
the absence of such a clause, and provided the treaty does not specifi-
cally prohibit it, a suspension as to one or more parties may be allowed
if it would not deprive the other remaining contracting parties of the
benefits of the treaty, would not adversely affect the performance of
their treaty obligations, and would not be deemed incompatible with
the object and purpose of the treaty.142
Additionally “(a) treaty may be amended by agreement be-
tween the parties.”143  As such, the Member States can change the ob-
ligations of any or all Member States.  If the treaty does not have
language regarding amendment, the Vienna Convention provides for
notification and negotiations for the effect of any amendment.144  A
treaty and or any of its terms may be suspended, despite the fact that
there may be no clause allowing for such suspension in the treaty it-
self.145  A treaty may be terminated or a party may withdraw at any
time, provided all the contracting parties consent.146
If a party to a bilateral treaty commits a material breach of its
obligations under the treaty, the non-breaching party is entitled to ei-
ther terminate the treaty or suspend its operation in whole or in
part.147 In the case of multilateral treaties, however, there are a vari-
ety of treaty rights and obligations to contend with: the rights of the
parties as a group and the rights of individual states.148
With respect to multilateral treaties, The Vienna Convention
provides:
2. A material breach of a multilateral treaty by one of the
parties entitles:
(a) the other parties by unanimous agreement to suspend
the operation of the treaty in whole or in part or to termi-
nate it either:
(i) in the relations between themselves and the
defaulting State; or
(ii) as between all the parties;
(b) a party specially affected by the breach to invoke it as
a ground for suspending the operation of  the treaty in
140 Id. art. 57(b).
141 Id. art. 58.
142 Id. art. 58(1)(b)(i)-(ii).
143 Vienna Convention, supra note 92, art. 39.
144 Id. art. 40.
145 Id. art. 72.
146 Id. art. 54(b).
147 Id. art. 60(1).
148 KACZOROWSKA, supra note 34, at 131.
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whole or in part in the relations between itself and the
defaulting State;
(c) any party other than the defaulting State to invoke
the breach as a ground for suspending the operation of
the treaty in whole or in part with respect to itself if the
treaty is of such a character that a material breach of its
provisions by one party radically changes the position of
every party with respect to the further performance of its
obligations under the treaty.
3. A material breach of a treaty, for the purposes of this
article, consists in:
(a) a repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the pre-
sent Convention; or
(b) the violation of a provision essential to the accom-
plishment of the object or purpose of the treaty.149
As is evident, non-breaching Member States have a variety of actions
at their disposal vis a` vis the defaulting Member States, either by vir-
tue of such default, or by virtue of the defaulting Member State having
misrepresented its fiscal and monetary performance prior to such de-
faults. If a contracting party to a treaty finds it impossible to perform
its obligations under a treaty, such party may invoke such impossibil-
ity for either terminating or withdrawing if that impossibility arises
because of the permanent disappearance or destruction of something
necessary for the execution of the treaty itself.150  However, if the im-
possibility is temporary, such impossibility can only be invoked for
suspending the operation of the treaty.151  Under international law, if
the impossibility is a result of a breach by the party invoking impossi-
bility, such impossibility may not be invoked for breaching either a
treaty obligation or some other obligation owed to the another con-
tracting party.152
In general, the parts of a treaty are not separable and a party
may not withdraw from or denounce a particular clause of a treaty
unless the treaty so provides.153 It is generally all or nothing,154 unless
(a) the said clauses are separable from the remainder of
the treaty with regard to their application;
(b) it appears from the treaty or is otherwise established
that acceptance of those clauses was not an essential ba-
sis of the consent of the other party or parties to be
149 Vienna Convention, supra note 92, art. 60(2)-(3).
150 Id. art. 61(1).
151 Id.
152 Id. art. 61(2).
153 Id. art. 44.
154 Vienna Convention, supra note 92.
34080-rgl_12-4 Sheet No. 27 Side A      11/14/2013   11:08:06
34080-rgl_12-4 Sheet No. 27 Side A      11/14/2013   11:08:06
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\R\RGL\12-4\RGL402.txt unknown Seq: 19 11-NOV-13 13:46
2013] EXITING THE EURO 497
bound by the treaty as a whole; and (c) continued per-
formance of the remainder of the treaty would not be
unjust.155
It is suggested that, inasmuch as the EU existed for some years prior
to the birth of the Euro, and since there are a number of Member
States who are not currently using the Euro, those portions of the EU
treaties—particularly the Lisbon Treaty—which deal with the Euro,
may be “separable from the remainder of the treaty.”156
The proposition that sovereign states are those who tradition-
ally have entered into treaties is an important one in this analysis.
Under international law, states have the ability to make all manner of
agreements, but particular principles have evolved to ensure that per-
sons representing states have the necessary power to enter into a
treaty.157  Where exactly the power to enter into treaties is vested is
generally a matter of each state’s internal laws.158  As an example, in
the United States, the President, with the advice and consent of the
Senate, has the power to enter into treaties.159 Likewise in Mexico, the
President has the power to enter into treaties that then must be rati-
fied by the Senate.160
SOVEREIGNTY
Some influential commentators have suggested that the Mem-
ber States have relinquished sovereignty to a substantial degree.161 In
fact, so much so that the treaties that make up the European Union,
on the one hand, and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on the
other, work in tandem, to create a constitutional framework, much like
that of the United States Constitution, so that withdrawal is not an
option.162  The argument continues that, for one to believe that the
Member States have retained sovereignty to the extent that they can
withdraw, one would have to believe in “an extreme and largely obso-
lete concept of sovereignty” under public international law.163  The
ECJ itself has said that “the transfer by the States from their domestic
155 Id. art. 44(3).
156 Id. art. 44(3)(a).
157 SHAW, supra note 83, at 908.
158 Id.
159 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
160 Constitucio´n PolI´tica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], art. 89, Diario
Oficial de la FederaciO´n [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.).
161 Phoebus Athanassiou, Withdrawal and Expulsion from the EU and EMU:
Some Reflections 1, 5 (European Central Bank, Working Paper No. 10, 2009) avail-
able at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scplps/ecblwp10.pdf.
162 Id. at 15.
163 Id.
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legal system to the Community legal system of the rights and obliga-
tions arising under the Treaty carries with it a permanent limitation
of their sovereign rights.”164
Can this notion of a permanent relinquishment of sovereignty
be plausible? Can it be accurate, especially in light of the Lisbon
Treaty? Could it have been the case even before the construction of the
Treaty of Lisbon? We suggest that, however much certain actors
within the European Union may argue otherwise, there is evidence to
uphold the argument that the Member States retain their sovereignty.
We suggest, therefore, that such a proposition is not based on an obso-
lete notion of sovereignty.
It has been settled law for some time that “(t)here is a pre-
sumption against derogation from sovereign freedom of action,”165 and
“(if) the wording of a treaty provision is not clear, in choosing between
several admissible interpretations, the one which involves the mini-
mum of obligations for the Parties should be adopted.”166  This pre-
sumption disappears only if there is a clear, express intention to
restrict sovereignty.167 The oft cited international jurists, Charles
Rousseau and Hans Kelsen, both believe that any notion of limited
sovereignty is simply a contradiction in terms, as they believe sover-
eignty, by its very nature, is absolute.168  Of course, this view admits
that a sovereign state is still subject to what they then called the “law
of nations,” or what is today “international law.”169  It is a general
principle that being subject to international law does not diminish a
state’s independence or sovereignty.170
By looking at what has actually happened “on the ground” in
Europe, it is evident that the Member States have relinquished only so
much sovereignty as to make the system work.  Member States who
have joined the Euro Zone have “surrender(ed) their monetary sover-
eignty to the Community.”171  However, those Member States with
164 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 594.
165 D.P. O’CONNEL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 256 (2d ed. 1970).
166 Article 3, Paragraph 2 of the Treaty of Lausanne (Frontier Between Turkey
and Iraq), Advisory Opinion, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 12, at 12 (Nov. 21).
167 O’CONNEL, supra note 165, at 257; see also S.S. Wimbledon (U.K. v. Japan),
1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 1, at 114 (Aug. 17).
168 CARLOS ARRELLANO GARCI´A, PRIMER CURSO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PU´B-
LICO 143 (4th. ed. 1999).
169 Id. at 153.
170 SHAW, supra note 83, at 181.
171 Erich Vranes, The “Internal” External Relations of EMU on the Legal Frame-
work of the Relationship of “In” and “Out” States, 6 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 361, 365
(2000).
34080-rgl_12-4 Sheet No. 28 Side A      11/14/2013   11:08:06
34080-rgl_12-4 Sheet No. 28 Side A      11/14/2013   11:08:06
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\R\RGL\12-4\RGL402.txt unknown Seq: 21 11-NOV-13 13:46
2013] EXITING THE EURO 499
derogation “retain their monetary policy powers according to national
law.”172
Commentators believe that one of the primary reasons for the
failure to ratify the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Eu-
rope was a concern on the part of many Member States that it would
require them to relinquish too much sovereignty.173  That was the rea-
son for the negotiation and drafting of the Treaty of Lisbon, which
eliminated many of the trappings of statehood that the draft constitu-
tion seemed to give the European Union, and thus allayed many
fears.174
Some even say a “British exit from the European Union looks
increasingly possible.”175  Pressure is mounting in the United King-
dom for the government to call a referendum on continued member-
ship.176  The British Prime Minister appears ready to warn the world
of that clear possibility.177  That is hardly the position of a state that
believes that it has relinquished sovereignty or that it has no options,
having signed the various treaties creating the European Union.
At least one commentator has suggested that a reason behind,
or secondary result of the creation by the Lisbon Treaty of the position
of High Representative and Vice President of the European Commis-
sion in one person and then the election/appointment of a person to the
post considered a light weight or “weak” player, was so that the person
in the position would not overshadow the discreet Member States.178
It seems that the EU Member States want the “high representative to
be their servant, not their rival.”179  Despite the creation of the foreign
policy mechanisms of the Lisbon Treaty, Member States are left to set
and implement their own foreign policy agendas.180 Whether this has
172 Id. at 366.
173 See Georgio Maganza, The Lisbon Treaty: A Brief Outline, 31 FORDHAM INT’L
L.J. 1603 (2007-08); see also Anthony Luzzatto Gardner & Stuart E. Eizenstat,
New Treaty, New Influence? 89 FOREIGN AFF. 104 (2010).
174 Maganza, supra note 173, at 1610-13
175 Britain’s Future: Goodbye Europe, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 8, 2012, available at
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21567940-british-exit-european-union-
looks-increasingly-possible-it-would-be-reckless.
176 Britain and Europe: Making the Break, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 8, 2012, availa-
ble at http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21567914-how-britain-could-fall-
out-european-union-and-what-it-would-mean-making-break.
177 John F. Burns & Alan Cowell, Cameron Warns that Britain Could Leave Euro-
pean Union, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/
01/19/world/europe/david-cameron-delays-talk-on-new-role-in-europe.html?_r=0.
178 Desmond Divan, Governance and Institutions: Implementing the Lisbon Treaty
in the Shadow of the Euro Crisis, 49 J. COMMON MARKET STUD. 103, 112 (2011).
179 Gardner & Eizenstat, supra note 173, at 104.
180 Id. at 110.
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come about because of the election and appointment of individuals or
because of the terms of the Treaty itself is a matter of conjecture.
The Treaty on European Union, known as the Maastricht
Treaty, states that:
The Union shall respect the equality of Member States
before the Treaties as well as their national identities,
inherent in their fundamental structures, political and
constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-govern-
ment.  It shall respect their essential State functions, in-
cluding ensuring the territorial integrity of the State,
maintaining law and order and safeguarding national se-
curity.  In particular, national security remains the sole
responsibility of each Member State.181
Thus, domestic constitutional courts—high courts within the Member
States—are permitted to set limits on the primacy of the law of the
European Union as to themselves;182 in other words, such courts and
their States retain legal sovereignty.  So that this multi-level constitu-
tional structure183 does not provide for a wholly subordinated set of
Member States, they are considered sovereign states, even though
they are members of a union, which provides for substantial benefits.
Accordingly, it can be cogently argued that there are ways out of or
around treaty obligations respecting either continued membership in
the European Union, the EMU, or both.
TREATY OF LISBON MODIFICATIONS
A. Background
On November 3, 2009, President Vaclav Havel of the Czech Re-
public signed the Treaty of Lisbon.  With that signature, the Treaty of
Lisbon cleared the last procedural hurdle to its effectiveness.184  Rati-
fication of the treaty by a sufficient number of Member States marked
the end of a long and arduous process.  However, initial intentions
differed.
This process first began in 2001, with negotiations for the
adoption of a constitution for the European Union.185  This constitu-
181 See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 40, art. 4(2).
182 Armin von Bogdandy & Stephan Schill, Overcoming the Absolute Primacy: Re-
spect for National Identity Under the Lisbon Treaty, 48 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
1417, 1417 (2011).
183 See id.
184 Dan Bilefsky & Stephen Castle, European Union Reform Moves Ahead, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 3, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/04/world/europe/04europe.
html.
185 Id.
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tion was intended to give the European Union many of the trappings of
statehood—a president, a foreign minister, and even a public prosecu-
tor (akin to an attorney general), as well as a flag and national an-
them.186  In addition, the Constitutional Treaty would replace the
complex web of international agreements, which form the legal basis
for the European Union.187  Though executed by representatives of
each of the Member States with great fanfare, the Constitutional
Treaty was far from complete, since it required ratification by the na-
tional legislatures of each of the then twenty-five Member States.188
In the end, only eighteen of the Member states ratified the Constitu-
tional Treaty.189
The constitution was never implemented. In the years follow-
ing the adoption of the treaty, public sentiment in a number of Mem-
ber States turned against the treaty, with skeptics fearing that the
constitution would unduly impinge upon national sovereignty.190  Ulti-
mately, efforts to implement the Constitutional Treaty collapsed when
France and the Netherlands rejected the treaty in national refer-
enda.191  Following this event, European leaders went back to the
drawing board, began deliberations on a replacement treaty, and pro-
duced the Treaty of Lisbon.192
Rather than replacing the prior European Union documents in
their entirety, the Treaty of Lisbon took a more modest approach by
amending the existing European Union treaty documents but other-
wise leaving those treaties in place.193  Though it included many of the
same concepts that were included in the Constitutional Treaty, most
importantly, the Treaty of Lisbon did not call itself a “constitution,” as
proponents sought to avoid the same political upheaval that doomed
the Constitutional Treaty.194  It also dropped all references to the sym-
bols of the EU—the flag, the national anthem, and the motto—all mat-
ters closely associated with the relinquishment of Member States’
186 Thomas Fuller & Katrin Bennhold, Leaders Reach Agreement on a European
Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/19/
world/leaders-reach-agreement-on-a-european-constitution.html.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Maganza, supra note 173, at 1603-04 (discussing adoption and ratification
process).
190 Id. at 1604.
191 Marlise Simmons, Dutch Voters Solidly Reject New European Constitution,
N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2005, http://travel.nytimes.com/2005/06/02/international/eu-
rope/02dutch.html.
192 Maganza, supra note 173, at 1603.
193 Id. at 1609.
194 Id. at 1608-09.
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individual identity and sovereignty to a higher authority, issues
thought to be political hot buttons.195
B. Article I-60 of the Constitutional Treaty – A Path to Withdrawal
During the deliberations for the Constitutional Treaty, the
Member States negotiated the provision for voluntary withdrawal of a
Member State. As stated above, prior to efforts to implement the Con-
stitution, it was generally accepted wisdom that there was no unlim-
ited right of a Member State to withdraw from the EU.196  The
Constitutional Treaty negotiations sought to clarify this matter, and if
it were ever true, to change it.  There was extensive discussion and
debate regarding the final language of the withdrawal provision.197
Ultimately, the final text of Article I-60 of the Constitution Treaty
stated:
Voluntary withdrawal from the Union
1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the
Union in accordance with its own constitutional
requirements.
2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify
the
European Council of its intention. In the light of the
guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union
shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that
State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal,
taking account of the framework for its future relation-
ship with the Union.
That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with
Article III-325(3).  It shall be concluded by the Council,
acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent
of the European Parliament.
3. The Constitution shall cease to apply to the State in
question from the date of entry into force of the with-
drawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the no-
195 Q&A: The Treaty of Lisbon, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/
6901353.stm (last visited Oct. 23, 2012).
196 Jochen Herbst, Observations on the Right to Withdraw from the European
Union: Who are the “Masters of the Treaties?”, 6 GERMAN L. J. (SPECIAL ISSUE)
1755-59, 1755 (2005), available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdfs/Vol06
No11/PDF_Vol_06_No_11_1755-1760_Special%20Issue_Herbst.pdf (discussing
right to withdraw under Constitutional Treaty).
197 Id. at 1756 (referencing the numerous proposed amendments to the proposed
Constitution and related documentation which are available at http://european-
convention.eu.int/EN/amendments/amendmentsdfd1.html?content=46&lang=
EN).
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tification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European
Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned,
unanimously decides to extend this period.
4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of
the European Council or of the Council representing the
withdrawing Member State shall not participate in the
discussions of the European Council or Council or in Eu-
ropean decisions concerning it.
A qualified majority shall be defined as at least 72% of
the members of the Council, representing the participat-
ing Member States, comprising at least 65% of the popu-
lation of these States.
5. If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to
rejoin, its request shall be subject to the procedure re-
ferred to in Article I-58.198
Member States seemed concerned about relinquishing sovereignty,
and it is apparent that the exit provision was a critical aspect of the
Constitutional Treaty.  Inserting an exit clause in a constitutive docu-
ment is not a novel idea.  For example, Joseph Stalin’s 1936 constitu-
tion for the Soviet Union established an exit right for its Member
States.199 Similarly, Canada’s Supreme Court concluded that a prov-
ince could secede from the Canadian Confederation, subject to negotia-
tion of the terms of secession by way of an amendment to the Canadian
Constitution.200  Contrast this with the United States Constitution,
which provides no such express right, though this did not prevent the
U.S. from fighting a bloody civil war to resolve the debate about
whether an implied right of withdrawal existed.201  Nevertheless,
when considering the enhanced federal powers for the EU contem-
plated by the Constitutional Treaty, it is not surprising that Member
States would be hesitant about committing to this new structure with-
out reserving a way to pull out if circumstances change.
In general, withdrawal mechanisms in international federa-
tions fall into three broad categories: (1) state primacy; (2) federal pri-
198 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe art. I-60, June 14, 2004, 2004
O.J. (C310) 1, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/09_01_05_
constitution.pdf.
199 WHAT THE EU CONSTITUTION DOES: A 14 POINT CRITICAL SUMMARY, NATIONAL
PLATFORM EU RESEARCH & INFORMATION CENTRE (Mar. 2005), available at http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/inddem/docs/papers/14%20point%20summary.pdf.
200 Anthony DePalma, Canadian Court Rules Quebec Cannot Secede on its Own,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1998, available at  http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/21/world/
canadian-court-rules-quebec-cannot-secede-on-its-own.html.
201 U.S. CONST.
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macy; and (3) federal control.202  First, state primacy would provide
“an absolute, immediate and unilateral right for a Member State to
withdraw from the federation.”203  Second, a federal primacy model
would conversely absolutely prohibit any Member State from with-
drawing, “effectively making membership a one-way valve.”204  Lastly,
a federal control approach, on the one hand, would recognize the sover-
eign right of the Member State to withdraw but, on the other hand,
would condition such withdrawal upon a mutual agreement between
the departing Member and those remaining, establishing the terms for
such withdrawal along the lines of the Canadian system.205
Article 50 adopts a federal control approach.  A Member State
can decide to withdraw unilaterally in accordance with the provisions
of its state constitution.206 Once this decision is made, the Member
State notifies the European Council.  The EU then must negotiate an
agreement with the seceding Member, “setting out the arrangements
for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future rela-
tionship with the Union.”207 However, the negotiation period is not
open ended.  The withdrawal automatically becomes effective two
years following the date of notification of the decision of the Member
State to withdraw, regardless of whether the agreement on the terms
of withdrawal has been finalized, with such two-year period only sub-
ject to extension if the withdrawing Member and the European Coun-
cil unanimously agree.208 Ultimately, the agreement requires the
approval of a so-called “qualified majority” of the European Council
(i.e. 72% of the members of the European Council, representing Mem-
ber States comprising at least 65% of the population of the voting
Members), after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.
C. Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon
Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon carried forward the with-
drawal provisions of the Constitutional Treaty, with insignificant mod-
ifications, virtually leaving the Constitution’s escape clause intact.
The following is a comparison between the text of Article 50 of the
Treaty of Lisbon with its predecessor, Article I-60 of the Constitutional
202 Raymond J. Friel, Providing a Constitutional Framework for Withdrawal from
the EU: Article 59 of the Draft European Constitution, 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 407,
422 (2004) (discussing framework for withdrawal mechanism).
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 423.
206 Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 7, art. 50(1).
207 Id. art. 50(2).
208 Id. art. 50(3).
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Treaty (note that deletions are shown by strikethrough and additions
are shown by underlining):209
Constitutional Treaty of Lisbon
Article I-6050
Voluntary withdrawal from the Union
1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the
Union in accordance with its own constitutional
requirements
2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall no-
tify the European Council of its intention.  In the
light of the guidelines provided by the European
Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an
agreement with that State, setting out the arrange-
ments for its withdrawal, taking account of the
framework for its future relationship with the Union.
That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance
with Article III-325(3)218(3) of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union.  It shall be con-
cluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting
by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of
the European Parliament.
3. The Constitution Treaties shall cease to apply to the
State in question from the date of entry into force of
the withdrawal agreement or, failing that two years
after notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless
the European Council, in agreement with the Mem-
ber State concerned, unanimously decides to extend
this period.
4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member
of the European Council or of the Council represent-
ing the withdrawing Member State shall not partici-
pate in the discussions of the European Council or
Council or in European decisions concerning it.
A Qualified majority shall be defined as at least 72%
of the members of the Council representing the par-
ticipating Member States, comprising at least 65% of
the population of these States, in accordance with
Article 238(3)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union.
209 While these markings may appear to be Track Changes that have not been
accepted, they actually amount to purposeful changes that are still marked in or-
der to show the changes that the Treaty drafters made.
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5. If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks
to rejoin, its request shall be subject to the procedure
referred to in Article I-58.49.
Note that the definitions of “qualified majority” in each provision func-
tion essentially in the same manner.  Though the definition of “quali-
fied majority” in the TFEU210 has a number of meanings, in the case of
a withdrawing Member, the voting process on the European Council
would be identical to the Constitutional Treaty, which requires ap-
proval by 72% of the members of the European Council, representing
Member States comprising at least 65% of the population of the voting
Members.211
UNDERSTANDING THE WITHDRAWAL MECHANISM
A. Withdrawl Under International Law
What exactly do we mean by the term “withdraw”?  There are
thirteen references to the word “withdraw” (or variations thereof) in
the Treaty of Lisbon, the TFEU.212  Six of these thirteen references
appear in Article 50; references to the word “withdraw” in other parts
of the documents are related to other issues.213  However, nowhere in
either document, or in the Constitutional Treaty, is the term “with-
draw” defined.  Even though the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties mentions the term more than 30 times, it does not define the
term with any exactitude either. When the Vienna Convention uses
the term, however, it is normally in conjunction with the terms termi-
nating and suspending.214
The Vienna Convention does say that a party must give at least
12 months’ notice prior to denunciation or withdrawal.215 Black’s Law
Dictionary defines “withdrawal” as “the act of taking back or away;
withdrawal of consent; the act of retreating from a place, position or
situation; . . . Renunciation.”216  Therefore, the common legal usage of
210 See generally Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Eu-
ropean Union, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].
211 Id. art. 15.
212 See generally id.
213 E.g., Article 7(2) of the TFEU refers to withdrawal of proposed legislation in
the European Parliament, while Article 78(2)(d) of the TFEU refers to “common
procedures for the granting and withdrawing of uniform asylum or subsidiary pro-
tection status.” Id. art. 7(2); id. art. 78(2)(d).
214 See, e.g., Vienna Convention, supra note 92, art. 61.
215 Id. art. 56, para. 2.
216 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 712 (9th ed. 2009).  Note that other related defini-
tions in the dictionary refer to removing funds from a banking institution, exiting
from a criminal conspiracy, and other irrelevant usages of the term.
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the term, except perhaps for the idea of “renunciation,” is unhelpful to
our analysis.
B. Meaning of Article 50
The question then is what did the framers of the Treaty of Lis-
bon (and the Constitutional Treaty) intend in Article 50? Did they
mean that the electing Member State may decide to leave the EU in its
entirety? Or, did they intend to allow for a partial withdrawal, such as
removing the Member State from certain aspects of the EU, but re-
maining part of the EU for other purposes? This article addresses the
proposition or the possibility of whether the withdrawing Member
State can elect to withdraw solely from the EMU and remain part of
the EU for all other purposes. After all, the language does provide, in
the case of withdrawal negotiation, that an agreement is to be reached
regarding the withdrawing state’s “future relationship with the
Union.”
C. Consensus Among Commentators
One commentator has concluded that Article 50 is intended to
be an “all or nothing” proposition.217  Under this theory, when a Mem-
ber State seeks to “withdraw” under Article 50, that Member State is
electing to leave the EU in its entirety, including all of the EU’s associ-
ated organizations and subsets, including the Euro. The arguments
against permitting an interpretation which would allow selective with-
drawal from aspects of the EU fall into three general categories: tex-
tual, procedural, and practical.
The textual critics take a “strict constructionist” approach to-
wards the text of Article 50.  They argue that the text is clear; the
phrase “withdraw from the Union” in Article 50(1) means secession
from the entire Union.  Their argument continues, that had the draft-
ers intended to allow the electing Member State to withdraw from only
aspects of the EU, such as the EMU, they would have specifically pro-
vided for that inside the text of the provision.218  Supporting this view
is the language of Article 50(3), which provides that “[t]he Treaties
shall cease to apply to the State in question . . .” (Emphasis added).
This provision implies that all of the EU treaties will cease to apply to
the withdrawing state, not some of them. Textual commentators argue
that any other interpretation of the text would “amount to a very ex-
217 Hans Hofmeister, Goodbye Euro: Legal Aspects from Withdrawal from the
Euro Zone, 18 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 111, 131 (Fall 2011) (discussing interpretation of
Article 50 text).
218 Id. at 132.
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tensive reading of this provision and exceed the limits of jurispruden-
tial interpretation.”219
The procedural arguments focus on the language in Article
50(2). This language provides for the negotiation of “an agreement
with the [withdrawing] State setting out the arrangements for its
withdrawal” and the requirement of Article 50(3), which mandates
that such an agreement be finalized within “two years” after the Mem-
ber State initially notifies the European Council of its decision to with-
draw.220 The two-year deadline provided for in the text, these critics
argue, would prevent an interpretation that the provision was meant
to intend for the negotiated agreement to provide for partial or selec-
tive membership in the EU.  The reasoning is that the agreement is
not mandatory: if it is never signed, the withdrawal takes place any-
way. Thus, the withdrawing Member State could not reasonably ex-
pect to utilize Article 50 to exit only the EMU, because if an agreement
is never finalized, the withdrawal would take place and the only con-
clusion is that the withdrawal would be comprehensive.221 Supporting
this conclusion is the language in Article 50(5), which provides that a
Member State that elects withdrawal, but later changes its mind,
must reapply for membership in the EU as if it were a new
applicant.222
Those who take a practical approach fear the “slippery slope”
that selective withdrawal from the EU could allow. One commentator
points to the nebulous “agreement” that must be negotiated following
an election to withdraw and responds to suggestions that the negotia-
tion phase of the agreement is intended to allow the departing state to
choose which EU institutions to keep and which to discard.223  The
argument continues that this approach is “questionable, not least from
a public policy perspective,”224 in that allowing a departing nation to
“pick and choose” among which treaty obligations to retain and which
to ignore would “effectively encourage an a` la carte approach to EU
participation” in general.225 This would work against the philosophical
underpinnings of the EU in the sense that, by joining the EU, the
Member States were making an irreversible commitment to European
unity and discarding the outdated prejudices of nationalism.226 Moreo-
ver, this “would pose a qualitatively different and arguably intolerable
219 Id.
220 Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 7, art. 50(2)-(3).
221 Hofmeister, supra note 217, at 125-26.
222 Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 7, art. 50(5).
223 See Athanassiou, supra note 161, at 39.
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 See generally Callender, supra note 4.
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challenge to the EU’s integrity and sustainability,”227 in that it may
encourage Member States to seek selective participation in the EU in
other areas as well.
THE ARGUMENT FOR SELECTIVE WITHDRAWAL
A. Answering the Critics
Nevertheless, there are ample arguments to refute each of the
concerns raised by those skeptical about interpreting Article 50 to al-
low selective withdrawal from the EU.  There is considerable textual
evidence that selective withdrawal may have been contemplated in the
adoption of Article 50.228  Similarly, one may raise procedural argu-
ments in support of a selective withdrawal mechanism.229  Lastly,
there are significant practical reasons for why a selective withdrawal
framework may benefit the EU and contribute to the survival of the
EMU.230
B. The Textual Argument
Regarding the negotiation of the agreement for withdrawal,
Section 2 of Article 50 provides that:
In the light of the guidelines provided by the European
Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an
agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements
for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework
for its future relationship with the Union (emphasis
added).231
By including the phrase “framework for its future relationship,” the
drafters “thus assume that some kind of (legal) relationship will still
remain between the Union and the withdrawing member state even
after the withdrawal has come into effect.”232  Therefore, if the draft-
ers contemplated some future association, it seems logical to explore
whether the Member State could remain part of some EU institutions
following its election to secede from the EU—all of which would be
specified in the withdrawal agreement.  Moreover, if some form of con-
tinuing involvement is in fact contemplated, it is not much of a leap to
contend that continued participation by the withdrawing Member
State in many EU institutions, with the exception of the EMU, would
227 Athanassiou, supra note 161, at 40.
228 See generally Herbst, supra note 196.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 7, art. 50.
232 Herbst, supra note 196, at 1757.
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be considered during the negotiation of any such withdrawal agree-
ment. As stated above, there are currently Member States who do not
use the Euro.233 The terms of the agreement are not limited in the text
and could be far reaching to include creative and expansive provisions
implementing a strong and multi-faceted relationship between the EU
and the withdrawing member.
C. The Procedural Argument
Unfortunately, Section 3 provides specifically that “[t]he Trea-
ties shall cease to apply” to the withdrawing member state.234 The use
of this phrase seems to foreclose the possibility of selective application
of some of the EU treaties following withdrawal, therefore prohibiting
partial “membership” pursuant to the existing Treaties.  Section 5 of
Article 50 supports this interpretation, in that it requires that if a
withdrawing member changes its position on withdrawal, it must
reapply to the EU as if it were a brand new applicant for
membership.235
However, though the withdrawing Member cannot retain its
status as a Member state pursuant to the treaties within the frame-
work of Article 50, by providing for a “future relationship,” the framers
of the Article left open the possibility of continued involvement by the
withdrawing Member with some EU institutions. Since the terms of
the agreement are not delineated in Article 50, there is no reason that
such an agreement cannot take the form of a new treaty between the
EU and its remaining Members, on the one hand, and the withdrawing
Member State on the other hand, thus replacing the “Treaties” refer-
enced in Section 3.  A new treaty could, therefore, effectively allow for
the continuation of some of the EU institutions for the benefit of the
withdrawing Member State and its citizens.
In addition, Section 3, which provides that “[t]he Treaties shall
cease to apply,”236 and Section 2, which provides for a “future relation-
ship”237 between the withdrawing Member and the EU, can be harmo-
nized. One can argue that by not providing that all of the Treaties
shall cease to apply, the drafters allowed for the possibility that some
of the Treaties could continue to apply.  In this vein, the agreement
contemplated by Section 2 would then establish which of the Treaties
or treaty provisions would continue to apply to the withdrawing Mem-
ber State.  However, “such an interpretation would amount to a very
233 See supra notes 125, 156 and accompanying text.
234 Herbst, supra note 196, at 1757.
235 Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 7, art. 50(5).
236 Id. art. 50(3).
237 Id. art. 50(2).
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extensive reading of this provision and exceed the limits of jurispru-
dential interpretation.”238
Lastly, some commentators point to the two-year deadline im-
posed by Section 3 as support for their argument against selective
withdrawal.239  Section 3 provides that if the withdrawal agreement is
not concluded within two-years following the withdrawing Member
State’s election to withdraw, the withdrawal becomes effective auto-
matically.240  This deadline, they argue, effectively makes the with-
drawal agreement optional, rather than mandatory and, because it is
optional, withdrawal from some (but not all) of the EU institutions was
never contemplated.  Departing a “highly complex institution such as
the EMU,” one scholar writes, “requires a detailed agreement, specify-
ing the legal consequences for the parties concerned.”241  In essence,
reconfiguring the European monetary system is too dangerous a task
to be left to an optional agreement.
The deadline argument, however, does not appear to be persua-
sive.  The drafters needed some deadline, if only to be an incentive to
the negotiators to conclude their deliberations on the withdrawal
terms.  Instituting a deadline should not be interpreted to mean that
the agreement is itself insignificant or that the scope of such an agree-
ment was meant to be limited in any way.  In fact, Section 3 of Article
50 allows the European Council, albeit unanimously, and the with-
drawing Member to extend the deadline if needed.242
D. The Practical Argument
An exit from the European Union is not unprecedented.
Greenland, formerly a colony of Denmark and then a part of Denmark,
was allowed to exit the European Union.243  Greenland submitted a
formal request for withdrawal and then negotiated that withdrawal
and its subsequent status.244  In fact, due to the monetary crisis in
238 Hofmeister, supra note 217, at 132.
239 See generally id.
240 Id. at 125-26.
241 Id. at 133.
242 Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 7, art. 50(3).
243 See The Greenland Treaty of 1985, Jan. 1, 1985, 1985 O.J. (I 29) 1, available at
http://eu.nanoq.gl/Emner/EuGl/~/media/419EF30F356645048639049D197273D3.
ashx.
244 Id. (“A referendum was held in 1982 and a majority voted in favour of with-
drawal. Between 1982 and 1984 the terms were negotiated and on February 1,
1985 Greenland formally withdrew from the Community. A Treaty on Greenland’s
withdrawal from the Community was made – the Greenland Treaty – declaring
Greenland as a “special case.  This special case provided a fisheries agreement
between the parties, in which the EU kept its fishing rights and Greenland kept
its financial contribution as before withdrawal. It also gave Greenland tariff free
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Cyprus, Cyprus nearly left the Euro.245 The Wall Street Journal re-
cently stated that, absent a viable bailout scheme, Cyprus “could find
itself with little choice but to leave the Euro zone.”246  Cyprus negoti-
ated a memorandum of understanding with the European Commis-
sion, the European Central Bank, and the IMF in November of 2012,
requiring cost cutting measures. That has not worked.247 The negotia-
tions to secure a bailout deal have been rancorous,248 and a deal was
again reached on March 24, 2013.249 All are hopeful that the bailout
will work. The larger Euro Zone countries, such as Germany, have
been willing to take a hard line approach with Cyprus.250 A potential
exit from the Euro, whether forced or voluntary on the part of Cyprus,
points to neither an iron clad treaty (with no potential for being forced
out in the event such a forced exit were to occur) nor a loss of sover-
eignty in the latter case of a voluntary exit. There is now pressure
mounting on Malta and Slovenia to put their economic and monetary
houses in order and there has even been talk of expulsion from the
EMU if they do not.251
Article 50 has textual shortcomings, including problems relat-
ing to timing, lack of specificity, and provisions that appear internally
inconsistent.  However, despite the assertions of other commentators
to the contrary, there is sufficient ambiguity in the text and mechanics
of Article 50 to contend that a Member can effectively accomplish a
access of fisheries products to the EU as long as there exists a satisfactory fisher-
ies agreement.”).
245 See Mark Memmott, Cypriots Are Suspicious, but Bailout Deal Seems Set,
NPR, March 25, 2013.
246 See Charles Forelle, Matina Stevis & David Enrich, Clock Ticks on Cyprus,
WALL. ST. J., Mar. 22, 2013, at A1.
247 See Nikolas Kulish, conservative is Elected President in Cyprus, N.Y. TIMES
Feb. 24, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/25/world/europe/con-
servative-candidate-elected-president-in-cyprus.html?_r=0.
248 See A Bungled Bank Raid, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 23, 2013, at 75; see also Liz
Alderman, Rejection of Deposit Tax Scuttles Deal on Bailout for Cyprus, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 19, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/20/business/global/cyprus-
rejects-tax-on-bank-deposits.html?_r=0; see also Von Sebastian Jost, Karsten
Seibel & Dorothea Siems, Large investors Lose up to 90 percent in Cyprus, DIE
WELT, Mar. 23, 2013, available at http://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article114760715/
Grossanleger-verlieren-auf-Zypern-bis-zu-90-Prozent.html.
249 James Kanter, Liz Alderman & Andrew Higgens, E.U. Officials Agree to a Deal
Rescuing Cyprus, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/03/25/business/global/cyprus-and-europe-officials-agree-on-outlines-of-a-
bailout.html?pagewanted=all.
250 See Thomas Straubhaar, Why the Hard Line Against Cyprus Is Proper, DIE
WELT, Mar. 26, 2013, http://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article114767497/Warum-die-
harte-Linie-gegen-Zypern-richtig-ist.html.
251 See NPR News, Apr. 4, 2013.
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partial withdrawal from the EU. This withdrawal may take the form
of a new agreement or treaty between the EU and the departing Mem-
ber, which would establish the terms and obligations for a revised rela-
tionship. That being said, if the current crisis revolves around the
Euro, it behooves European leaders to explore legal avenues which
would solve the source of the problem rather than resorting to legal
formalities to support an all or nothing approach to EU membership.
Also, something must be said for the nature of the EMU as op-
posed to other EU institutions. Certain Members, such as England and
Denmark, opted out from adopting the Euro.252 These two States nego-
tiated separate arrangements for the right to remain outside the
EMU,253 which demonstrated that the Euro was never intended to be
a “one size fits all” solution.  Similarly, though the EU treaties envi-
sion that all Member States will eventually become part of the EMU,
the treaties require the fulfillment of four so-called “convergence crite-
ria” before these states can become part of the Euro.254  Currently,
there are 10 Member States which have either opted out, or are consid-
ered Member States “with a derogation,” meaning that they have not
yet achieved the convergence criteria.255  This is an interesting, yet
problematic matter.  Sweden, for example, despite clear requirements
and textual exhortations otherwise,256 appears not to be willing to
adopt the Euro.257  This appears to be a clear breach of the treaty, not
simply a situation where a Member State has taken advantage of a
legal loophole.258 It seems, therefore, that the decision making process
respecting EMU membership is ether flawed or lenient.  It has been
argued, as mentioned above, that neither Italy nor Belgium met the
convergence criteria, yet were still admitted.259 Would they or should
they be equally lenient with those Member States who might wish to
renegotiate either their EU or EMU member status, or end their EMU
member status altogether? Therefore, if certain Members elected to
stay out of the Euro, while other Members may never achieve the crite-
ria required to join the Euro, it seems unfair and impractical to now
require that a Member must completely abandon the EU structure in
order to change their currency—a right which other Member States
effectively retain.
252 Hofmeister, supra note 217, at 119.
253 Id.
254 Id. at 115 (discussing the criteria which include price stability, sustainable
financial position, currency exchange standards, and the ability of the Member
State to maintain the other standards).
255 Id. at 118.
256 See generally TFEU, supra note 210, art. 98.
257 Vranes, supra note 171, at 373.
258 See id. at 369.
259 See id. at 374.
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As can be seen from the foregoing, despite what cheerleaders
for the European Union and the EMU might say about either the im-
possibility of withdrawal or the notion that withdrawal is unthinkable,
there are ways out. Under customary international law and modern
treaty law, the way that the European Union has dealt with Member
States who either do not wish to or do not qualify for EMU member-
ship (or do not fulfill their obligations under such membership) and
the words of the Lisbon Treaty itself, a variety of avenues of escape are
open to Member States. If a Member State has problems complying
with the needs of monetary union, that state is not doomed to remain a
member. Indeed, the easiest approach for a Member State might be
simply to become a Member with derogation status like Romania, or
become a Member State that has opted out, like the United Kingdom
or Denmark.  The United Kingdom and Denmark have opted out by
means of Protocols to the Treaty of Lisbon. Such Protocols have the
same legal significance as the treaty itself.260 Certainly the United
Kingdom, Romania, and Denmark are not second-class citizens within
the European Union.
LOAN COMMITMENTS
One might ask what happens if a Member State, like Greece
for example, defaults on its loan payment obligations, either as a con-
tinuing member of the EU and the EMU, or if Greece were to exit ei-
ther the EU or the EMU and then default thereafter? What are the
loan terms and to whom is it to be repaid? Indeed, does an exit from
the Euro Zone or the EU amount to a default under the terms of the
loan? The loan facilities to Greece are both through the European Cen-
tral Bank261 and through the IMF.262 Each loan facility is extended to
Greece as a sovereign state, and must be repaid by Greece alone; in the
case of the IMF facility, to the IMF, and in the case of the European
Central Bank facility, to the discrete Member States who have contrib-
uted to the facility in the amounts and proportions they have contrib-
uted.263 Regardless of the status of Greece as either a Member State of
260 See Vranes, supra note 171, at 368.
261 See ECB Saves Greece from Bankruptcy by Securing Emergency Loans-paper,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Aug. 3, 2012, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-08-03/
business/sns-rt-us-ecb-greecebre87302p-20120803_1_ecb-emergency-liquidity-as-
sistance-greece.
262 See Press Release No. 12/85, Int’l Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Board Ap-
proves C= 28 Billion Arrangement under Extended Fund Facility for Greece (Mar.
15, 2012), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2012/pr1285.htm; see
also Press Release No. 10/187, Int’l Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Board Ap-
proves C= 30 Billion Stand-By Arrangement for Greece (May 9, 2010), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2010/pr10187.htm.
263 See generally Euro Area Loan Facility Act 2010 (Nov. 7, 2010).
34080-rgl_12-4 Sheet No. 36 Side A      11/14/2013   11:08:06
34080-rgl_12-4 Sheet No. 36 Side A      11/14/2013   11:08:06
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\R\RGL\12-4\RGL402.txt unknown Seq: 37 11-NOV-13 13:46
2013] EXITING THE EURO 515
the EU or of the EMU, or not a member of either, Greece must repay
the loans in any event. There is no default escape clause or reduction
in obligations for a change in any such status.
However, the ECB loan facility agreement states that it can be
cancelled as to a lender (State) if “a constitutional court of a Lender or
other court with competent jurisdiction in relation to such Lender de-
cides in a final judgment that this Agreement or a Loan is violating the
constitution of the Lender and such violation cannot be remedied,”264
the loan commitment of that lender will be cancelled.265 It is clear,
therefore, that both the lender states and Greece entered into the facil-
ity as sovereign states. EU directives or any other mechanism, other
than perhaps a perceived need, did not force them into it.
CONCLUSION
The Europeans have for centuries been very creative in forging
economic and trade alliances, some that smacked of political alliances
and even elementary union. They have also, on more than one occa-
sion, attempted to confect monetary stability. Some of these attempts
were successful for long periods, but the monetary bits have often not
been so successful. Will this current attempt at monetary union be ul-
timately successful?
The March 2013 elections in Italy have once again jolted confi-
dence in the Euro. Not only do politicians seem unable to effectively
deal with the Euro crisis, but voters do not want to implement reforms
of any sort.266 What will happen? Whether Greece, Cyprus, Slovenia,
Portugal, or any other Member State will exit either the Euro Zone or
the European Union, or be ejected by its fellow Member States is a
matter of current, ongoing debate. Will the EMU end up being another
sputtering, failed experiment, or will it survive? This is a matter that
continues to ebb and flow, with the leaders of the region unable or un-
willing to take a politically difficult stand to fix the problem once and
for all. They resort to temporary bandages that do not really have a
long-term salutary effect. As Desmond Dinan, the Irish professor and
expert on the Euro problems has stated:
Apart from its implications for the stability of the
Eurozone and economic governance in the EU, the euro
crisis therefore revealed serious divergences among
Member States and rifts among national governments
that are bound to make the conduct of EU institutions
264 See id. par. 6(6)(b).
265 Id.
266 See Send in the Clowns: How Beppe Grillo and Silvio Berlusconi Threaten the
Future of Italy and the Euro, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 2, 2013.
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and governance even more challenging in the years
ahead.267
This issue is far from resolved. New currency crises are certain to crop
up. Whether these crises force European leaders to reexamine whether
it is advisable to maintain the EMU in its current membership config-
uration remains to be seen. Nevertheless, it is clear that reconfigura-
tion of the EMU is legally possible and must be one of the tools which
leadership considers in charting any new course.
267 Desmond Dinan, Governance and Institutions: Implementing the Lisbon Treaty
in the Shadow of the Euro Crisis, 49 J. COMMON MARKET STUD. 103, 119 (2011).
